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INTRODUCTION

As the adage goes, in this world, nothing can be said to be certain,
except death and taxes. Although this invariably proves to be true, tax
reform remains a central aspect of every election. With the 2020
election approaching, the public should expect to hear more about the
taxation of carried interest, as it remains a major point of controversy
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within the world of tax law.1 Specifically, carried interest is a portion
of the profits of a private investment fund that is distributed to fund
managers as compensation for a fund reaching a certain threshold of
profitability.2 Controversially, if fund managers hold the underlying
asset for a minimum of three years, the resulting carried interest is
currently taxed as a long-term capital gain at a maximum rate of 20%.3
If fund managers hold the underlying asset for less than this three-year
holding period, the resulting carried interest is taxed as a short-term
capital gain at a rate of approximately 40%.4 Yet, commentators claim
all carried interest should be taxed as ordinary income, which is taxed
at a maximum rate of approximately 40%.5
President Donald Trump made fixing this “tax loophole” a central
promise of his 2016 campaign.6 Despite passing ground-breaking tax
reform in the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, however, the carried interest
loophole remains largely untouched.7 The only significant reform
occurred in Section 1061 of the Internal Revenue Code, which
increased the holding period requirement from one year to a minimum
of three years, in order for carried interest to qualify for long-term
capital gains tax treatment.8 Not surprisingly, private investment fund
managers have utilized and designed various structures to circumvent
this requirement.9 Moreover, even under the assumption that the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) would challenge such structures, the
three-year holding requirement does not affect hedge fund or private
equity fund managers. Specifically, hedge funds generally hold assets
for less than one year, so carried interest distributed to hedge fund
managers was not receiving preferential long-term capital gains tax

1. See The Taxation of Carried Interest: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways
& Means, 110th Cong. 7 (2007) [hereinafter The Taxation of Carried Interest]

(statement of Peter R. Orszag, Director, Congressional Budget Office).
2. See id.
3. I.R.C. §§ 1, 1061 (2019).
4. Id. §§ 1, 1061.
5. Id. § 1; The Taxation of Carried Interest, supra note 1, at 7.
6. Alan Rappeport, Trump Promised to Kill Carried Interest. Lobbyists Kept it
Alive,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
22,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/22/business/trump-carried-interest-lobbyists.html
[https://perma.cc/QE2D-XLUT].
7. See id.
8. I.R.C. § 1061.
9. See generally Scott Dolson et al., 2019 Update — How to Deal with Section
1061’s Three Year Holding Period Requirement for Carried Interests, FROST BROWN
TODD:
TAX
L.
DEFINED
BLOG
(June
14,
2019),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=9a5f0c8e-983d-491f-99aeee0dde192696 [https://perma.cc/8MWQ-DWWS].
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treatment under the previous law.10 Furthermore, private equity funds
generally hold assets for far longer than three years, making Section
1061 ineffective for private equity fund managers.11
Although arguments present strong points in favor or against
amending the relevant laws, carried interest should not be taxed solely
as a long-term capital gain or as ordinary income. Specifically, Section
1061 should be tightened to more effectively limit the ability of fund
managers to gain long-term capital gain tax treatment, but also allow
such treatment in certain circumstances. An increase in the minimum
holding period requirement from three years to a five- to seven-year
period, an expansion in the definition of “related parties,” and bringing
other types of investments into its purview would make Section 1061
more effective. This additional tax revenue would amount to billions
of dollars and would have a significant effect on many indebted urban
areas.12 Yet, legislators must keep in mind that private investment
funds bring jobs, philanthropic endeavors, and economic growth to
American cities, especially New York City.13 Thus, a properly drafted
revision should continue to incentivize fund formation and allow
private investment funds to continue to help urban economies thrive.
Part I of this Note provides an overview of carried interest and
analyzes Section 1061’s stipulations and its resulting industry-wide
effects with a focus on hedge funds and private equity funds. Part II
discusses the arguments in favor of and against taxation of carried
interest as a long-term capital gain. Part III argues that carried interest
should not be taxed solely as a long-term capital gain or as ordinary
income, and that Section 1061 should be altered to further limit such
preferential tax treatment while properly incentivizing fund formation.
Part III concludes by illustrating how a properly drafted revision to
Section 1061 is significant to New York City.

10. See Scott Dolson, How New IRC § 1061 Impacts Carried Interests, FROST
BROWN TODD: LEGAL UPDATE (Feb. 26, 2018), https://frostbrowntodd.com/how-newirc-%C2%A7-1061-impacts-carried-interests-2/ [https://perma.cc/8WUF-MCEL].
11. See id.
12. CITIZENS BUDGET COMM’N, NYC DEBT OUTSTANDING: FISCAL YEARS 2002–
2018 (2018); Victor Fleischer, How a Carried Interest Tax Could Raise $180 Billion,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
5,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/06/business/dealbook/how-a-carried-interest-taxcould-raise-180-billion.html [https://perma.cc/V9DQ-S5KB] [hereinafter Fleischer,
Carried Interest Tax].
13. Charles Swenson, Economic Impact Analysis: Proposed New York State Tax
Increases on Carried Interest of the Private Funds Industry, AM. INV. COUNCIL 3, 5
(2019).
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I. CARRIED INTEREST: AN OVERVIEW
A. Carried Interest and I.R.C. Section 1061

Carried interest is the primary means by which private investment
fund managers are compensated.14 Private investment funds are
typically organized as limited partnerships with investors as the limited
partners and fund managers as the general partners.15 The fund
managers determine investments that the fund makes, and the fund
generates gains or losses through the operation of the investments
made by fund managers.16 As per partnership tax law, the resulting
gains or losses flow through to the partners.17 Carried interest is
distributed to fund managers if the fund reaches a certain threshold of
profitability.18 If fund managers do not hold the underlying investment
for a minimum of three years, the resulting carried interest is being
taxed as a short-term capital gain at a maximum rate of approximately
39.6%.19 However, if fund managers hold the underlying investment
for a minimum of three years, the resulting carried interest is currently
taxed as a long-term capital gain at a maximum rate of 20%.20 In
response to critics, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act addresses this issue in
I.R.C. Section 1061.21 Tax planning strategies and the general nature
of certain private investment funds reveal that Section 1061’s new
three-year holding period requirement is relatively ineffective.22

14. Daniel Feldman, Carried Interest: “That Is Pure Poppycock!”, 12 RUTGERS J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 513, 513–14 (2015).
15. In a limited partnership, general partners typically control major business
decisions and face unlimited personal liability. On the other hand, limited partners are
usually passive investors and only liable up to the extent of their investments. Thus,
limited partnerships allow fund managers to maintain control over investment
decisions and also allow limited partners to invest without fear of unlimited liability.
See id. at 516; Colleen DeBaise, Forming a Partnership, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 8, 2010),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704869304575109770640885814
[https://perma.cc/99VM-WLN4].
16. See Feldman, supra note 14, at 516.
17. I.R.C. § 704(b) (2019).
18. See The Taxation of Carried Interest, supra note 1, at 7.
19. I.R.C. §§ 1, 1061 (2019).
20. Id. §§ 1, 1061.
21. See id. § 1061; Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in
Private Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 35 (2008) [hereinafter Fleischer, Two and
Twenty] (exemplifying how Professor Victor Fleischer has been a significant critic of
the preferential tax treatment of carried interest and advocates for reform in this area);
Rappeport, supra note 6.
22. See Dolson et al., supra note 9.
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Hedge fund and private equity fund managers are some of the
wealthiest people in the world.23 The taxation of their compensation
arrangements is an area of constant debate and a major controversy in
tax law.24 Private investment funds typically follow what is known as a
“two and twenty” compensation structure.25 The 2% refers to the
minimal portion of their income that is composed of a management
fee.26 Specifically, this annual management fee is guaranteed in the
partnership agreement and is taxed as ordinary income.27 The 20%
refers to the portion of a fund manager’s income that is deemed a
profits interest.28 The profits interest is not guaranteed, as it is
incentive-based.29 Under a typical arrangement, a fund manager
usually sets a certain threshold of profitability that he must surpass and,
upon reaching the threshold, is able to garner a share of the profits.30
Subject to some slight restrictions, this profits interest can be taxed as
a long-term capital gain at a maximum rate of 20% with an additional
3.8% surtax of net investment income tax.31 For example, if a private
investment fund manager formed a fund and investors made an initial
total investment of $1,000,000, under a two and twenty compensation
structure, the manager would be allocated a management fee of 2% or
$20,000.32 If the fund performs over a designated threshold, such as a
profit of $500,000, the manager would get 20% of the profit or
$100,000.33
Since some investment funds invest relatively aggressively, these
fees can reach extraordinarily high amounts, but such aggressive
investments also run the risk of generating losses for investors.34 The
23. See Tom Maloney, The Best-Paid Hedge Fund Managers Made $7.7 Billion in
2018, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-

15/the-10-best-paid-hedge-fund-managers-made-7-7-billion-in-2018
[https://perma.cc/3PFJ-VMMJ].
24. See Rappeport, supra note 6.
25. See Feldman, supra note 14, at 513–14.
26. See id.
27. I.R.C. §§ 1, 1061 (2019); Feldman, supra note 14, at 513–14.
28. See Feldman, supra note 14, at 513–14.
29. See id. at 516.
30. The Taxation of Carried Interest, supra note 1, at 7.
31. I.R.C. §§ 1, 1061; David Rae, What Are the New Capital Gains Rates for 2020?,
FORBES (Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidrae/2020/01/13/new-capitalgains-rates-for-2020/#71c09ef843eb [https://perma.cc/YK3J-9FVP].
32. See Anne Sraders, What Is a Hedge Fund and How Do They Work?,
THESTREET
(July
23,
2019),
https://www.thestreet.com/personalfinance/education/what-is-a-hedge-fund-14662109 [https://perma.cc/5JAA-DLSG].
33. See id.
34. See id. The potential for large losses was especially evident in the collapse of
Tiger Management. Before its eventual closing, the hedge fund suffered losses of 19%
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preferential tax treatment of carried interest is so significant that
investment fund managers often forfeit a portion of their annual
management fee in exchange for a higher amount of carried interest.35
These fee waivers have become very common and allow fund managers
to forego the typical 2% management fee that would be taxed as
ordinary income.36 Instead, these fund managers can, therefore, earn
a higher rate of carried interest with its potential tax benefits.37
Moreover, since fund managers typically invest their own money into
the fund, the profits distributed based upon a fund manager’s invested
capital is often treated as a capital gain, subject to some slight
restrictions.38
Due to the significant amount of wealth involved, a constant debate
surrounds the preferential tax treatment of carried interest.39
Proponents of the preferential tax treatment claim that carried interest
is based upon the vicissitudes of the markets and is not guaranteed,
making long-term capital gains treatment most logical.40 Moreover,
these proponents rely on other various taxation-based arguments and
public policy rationales.41 On the other hand, critics of the current tax
treatment of carried interest liken carried interest to a bonus, and
affirm that it most logically should be taxed as ordinary income at a
maximum rate of approximately 40%.42 Similarly, these critics rely on
a variety of other taxation and public policy-related arguments.43
Congress has previously attempted to reform the taxation of carried
interest.44 These proposals have ranged from the full taxation of
carried interest as ordinary income to approaches categorizing carried
interest as a blend of ordinary and capital gains income.45 In 2007,

in 1999 alone. See Gregory Zuckerman et al., Fallout of Tiger Management’s Collapse
on Asian Markets Should Be Limited, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 31, 2000),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB954443007478201408 [https://perma.cc/A5HZ-38VW].
35. See Feldman, supra note 14, at 518–19.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. I.R.C. § 1 (2018); Sraders, supra note 32.
39. DONALD MARRON, URB. INST. & BROOKINGS INST.: TAX POL’Y CTR.,
GOLDILOCKS MEETS PRIVATE EQUITY: TAXING CARRIED INTEREST JUST RIGHT 1
(2016), https://www.urban.org/research/publication/goldilocks-meets-private-equitytaxing-carried-interest-just-right/view/full_report [https://perma.cc/2GB6-EQ93].
40. Id. at 2.
41. Id.
42. See id. at 1; I.R.C. § 1.
43. MARRON, supra note 39, at 1.
44. See Feldman, supra note 14, at 526–27.
45. DONALD J. MARPLES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22689, TAXATION OF HEDGE
FUND AND PRIVATE EQUITY MANAGERS 4 (2014).
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Representative Charles B. Rangel introduced a tax reform bill — H.R.
3970 — that would have been included in the Temporary Tax Relief
Act of 2007.46 Specifically, this bill proposed I.R.C. Section 710, which
would have effectively changed the taxation of any “investment
services partnership interest.”47 The proposed Section 710 would have
treated the distributive share of carried interest as compensation
income and, therefore, would have taxed fund managers at the
applicable ordinary income rates.48
Specifically, Section 710(a)(1), as proposed by Representative
Rangel, would have treated the net income arising from investment
service partnership interests as ordinary income regardless of the
character of the underlying asset.49 This proposed version of Section
710 would have only applied to partnerships focused on investing in
securities, commodities, or real estate and to a partner providing
substantial services consisting of investment advice or asset
management.50 This type of partnership was referred to as an
investment services partnership and the described investment services
were intended to cover the activities of private investment fund
managers.51 The proposed Section 710 did not characterize as ordinary
income the portion of a partner’s distributive share that consisted of
the partner’s invested capital.52 To avoid such recharacterization, the
bill required such invested capital allocations to be reasonable.53 To
be deemed reasonable, an allocation to invested capital of a partner
providing investment services could not be in excess of the amount
allocated to the partners not providing such services.54
Representative Rangel’s proposed Section 710 has not yet been
passed,55 and received significant criticism from tax experts.56
Professor Howard E. Abrams criticized the proposed Section 710,

46. Howard E. Abrams, Taxation of Carried Interests: The Reform That Did Not
Happen, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 197, 211–12 (2009) [hereinafter Abrams, Taxation of
Carried Interests].
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 213.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 223; see also id. at 198, 212 (citing Howard E. Abrams, A Close Look
at the Carried Interest Legislation, 117 TAX NOTES 961, 970–71 (2007) [hereinafter
Abrams, A Close Look]).
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emphasizing the great difficulties surrounding the recharacterization of
a portion of carried interest as ordinary income without considering the
underlying investment.57 Moreover, Professor Abrams claimed that
the proposed bill was an overly simplistic solution to a complicated
issue. Professor Abrams felt such arbitrary re-characterization of
income was directly contrary to the rudimentary principle that the tax
law should treat partners equally. Furthermore, it is advantageous that
income passes from a partnership to partners without any tax
modifications.58
In 2007, Senator Sander Levin introduced a tax reform bill to
Congress within the Temporary Tax Relief Act of 2007.59 This bill
proposed to treat income received by general partners for the
performance of investment management services as ordinary income
regardless of the character of the underlying assets.60 This bill was
drafted very broadly, applying to investment services partnerships and
to entities not classified as investment services partnerships.61
Congress did not support this proposal, as it was introduced in the
House of Representatives and ultimately was not passed.62
In 2009, Senator Levin introduced a bill as part of the Job Creation
and Tax Cuts Act of 2010.63 This bill proposed to set a fixed percentage
of partnership distributions distributed to fund managers of investment
management partnerships as ordinary income and a fixed percentage
as capital gains income.64 Under this proposed Section 710, a fixed
percentage of carried interest would be taxed at ordinary income rates,
notwithstanding the original character of the income and if it would
have been treated as capital gains.65 Moreover, a fixed percentage
would keep pass-through capital gains character.66 In an effort to
compromise with proponents of the current tax treatment of carried

57. Professor Abrams emphasized the difficulties of recharacterizing carried
interest regardless of the character of the underlying investments by saying that “the
current manner of taxing carried interests is more consistent with general principles of
taxation than is admitted by its critics . . . .” Abrams, Taxation of Carried Interests,
supra note 46, at 198; see also Abrams, A Close Look, supra note 56, at 970–71.
58. Abrams, A Close Look, supra note 56, at 970–71; Abrams, Taxation of Carried
Interests, supra note 46, at 198–99.
59. See Feldman, supra note 14, at 526–27.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. Id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id.
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interest, the bill proposed a 75/25 split, meaning 75% of a carried
interest would be treated as ordinary income and 25% would retain
pass through capital gains character.67
Tax experts criticized Senator Levin’s 2009 proposal because it
directly conflicted with the basic principle of Schedule K — that
partnership income flows through to partners without any changes.68
Moreover, scholars indicated that the bill was far too simple of a
solution to an extraordinarily complex issue.69 Like the 2007 bill
proposed by Senator Levin, this bill was introduced in the House of
Representatives and died in a House Subcommittee.70
The 113th Congress’s S. 268 and President Obama’s FY2014 Budget
Proposal also proposed relatively significant reforms in the taxation of
carried interest.71 Both proposals sought to tax carried interest as
ordinary income, but made exceptions for enterprise value.72 The
value of private investment funds is partially composed of goodwill,
which is typically referred to as enterprise value.73 There is no clear
way to tax enterprise value, as scholars indicate that it has both
ordinary and capital gains characteristics.74 Both proposals recognized
the dual nature of enterprise value and sought to allow enterprise value
that is unrelated to providing investment services and distinct from
other types of partnership value to be taxed as capital gains.75
Moreover, each proposal would have taxed the remainder of carried
interest resulting from investment partnerships at ordinary income
rates.76 According to the Joint Committee on Taxation, Congress’s
proposal would have raised $3.1 billion in tax revenues from 2014 to
2023.77 Furthermore, President Obama’s proposal would have raised
$17.4 billion in tax revenues from 2014 to 2023.78 Like other attempts
at carried interest tax reform, S. 268 was introduced in the Senate and

67. See id.
68. See id.
69. Tax scholars have argued that simply recharacterizing carried interest would
alter the fundamental principle of the pass-through taxation of partnerships and would
carry significant consequences. See Feldman, supra note 14, at 527.
70. See id.
71. See MARPLES, supra note 45, at 6.
72. See id. at 6–7.
73. Goodwill is typically described as the excess of a partnership’s value over its
physical assets and future income streams. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 5.
77. See id.
78. See id.
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died, and President Obama’s carried interest proposal was not included
in the budget.79
Throughout his 2016 presidential campaign, then-candidate Donald
Trump consistently pledged to close the hedge fund “tax loophole,” in
reference to the preferential tax treatment of carried interest.80 During
the finalization of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, White House
economic advisor Gary Cohn pushed for significant reform in the area,
attempting to have the Act treat carried interests as ordinary income.81
By contrast, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin emphasized
preserving the current tax treatment as much as possible but adding
small revisions.82 In the end, Mnuchin prevailed, and the 2017 Tax Cuts
and Jobs Act did little to address the issue.83 The new statute —
Section 1061 — is the major revision related to carried interest.84
Section 1061 was signed into law on December 22, 2017 and is
effective for tax years beginning after 2017.85 In part, Section 1061
states:
(a) In general. If one or more applicable partnership interests are held
by a taxpayer at any time during the taxable year, the excess (if any)
of —
(1) the taxpayer’s net long-term capital gain with respect to such
interests for such taxable year, over
(2) the taxpayer’s net long-term capital gain with respect to such
interests for such taxable year computed by applying paragraphs
(3) and (4) of sections 1222 by substituting “3 years” for “1 year”,

79. See Hunter Walker, Obama Still Wants to Kill Wall Street’s Favorite Tax
Loophole,
BUS.
INSIDER
(Mar.
3,
2014,
8:00
PM),

https://www.businessinsider.com/obama-fiscal-year-2015-budget-2014-3
[https://perma.cc/MN84-BMHA].
80. President Trump “called hedge fund managers ‘paper pushers’ who were
‘getting away with murder’ partly because of measures including the carried-interest
provision that he said allowed them to shield their wealth and to minimize their tax
burdens.” Tiffany Hsu, Trump Vowed End to Key Wall St. Loophole. G.O.P. Tax Plan
Leaves
It
Intact,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
3,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/03/business/trump-carried-interest-taxloophole.html [https://perma.cc/2QU5-VWT4].
81. Dolson et al., supra note 9.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See id.
85. 2017 Tax Reform Enacts a Three-Year Holding Period Rule for Carried
Interests, BAKER TILLY (Mar. 30, 2018), https://www.bakertilly.com/insights/2017-taxreform-enacts-a-three-year-holding-period-rule-for-carried-interes/
[https://perma.cc/C4SD-TNV3] [hereinafter 2017 Tax Reform].
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shall be treated as short-term capital gain, notwithstanding
section 83 or any election in effect under section 83(b).86

In comparison to the previous law, Section 1061 imposes a more
significant holding period requirement before carried interest receives
preferential long-term capital gains tax treatment.87 For example,
previously, funds only needed to hold the underlying asset for a
minimum of one year before the resulting carried interest would be
taxed at long-term capital gains rates.88 However, given the changes of
Section 1061, the underlying asset would need to be held for a
minimum of three years for the resulting carried interest to be treated
as a long-term capital gain.89 If the underlying asset was not held for
three years, the carried interest would be taxed at the higher short-term
capital gains rates.90
Section 1061(c)(1) defines an applicable partnership interest to
mean “any interest in a partnership which, directly or indirectly, is
transferred to (or is held by) the taxpayer in connection with the
performance of substantial services by the taxpayer, or any other
related person, in any applicable trade or business.”91 Thus, a fund
manager’s management and structuring of the fund fits within this
definition of applicable partnership interest.92
Furthermore, the term “applicable trade or business” is defined to
mean:
[A]ny activity conducted on a regular, continuous, and substantial
basis which, regardless of whether the activity is conducted in one or
more entities, consists, in whole or in part, of –
(A) raising or returning capital, and
(B) either —
(i) investing in (or disposing of) specified assets (or identifying
specified assets for such investing or disposition), or
(ii) developing specified assets.93

Specifically, the “applicable trade or business” designation
delineates what types of businesses fall within the purview of Section

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

I.R.C. § 1061 (2019).

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.

Dolson et al., supra note 9.
I.R.C. § 1061.
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1061.94 Since Section 1061(c)(1) provides that Section 1061 applies to
raising capital and investing in specified assets, the continuous and
substantial work of managing a private investment fund qualifies as an
“applicable trade or business.”95 Section 1061 also defines “specified
assets” as securities, commodities, real estate held for rental or
investment, cash, and options or derivative contracts with respect to
any of these assets.96 Thus, Section 1061 clearly addresses the taxation
of carried interest,97 and its three-year holding period requirement
applies to capital gains realized by the partnership regardless of when
the individual acquired the applicable partnership interest.98
Although Section 1061 modified the traditional treatment of carried
interest, the statute has a major inadequacy.99 Specifically, it contains
an exception that removed almost all of the teeth of the new rule.100 In
part, Section 1061 states “the term ‘applicable partnership interest’
shall not include . . . any interest in a partnership directly or indirectly
held by a corporation.”101 The legal community quickly noticed that
the corporation exception did not explicitly say it was solely for C
corporations.102 Thus, private investment fund managers quickly
began forming S corporations to take advantage of the corporation
exception and to continue to receive preferential tax treatment of
carried interest.103 In Notice 2018-18, however, the IRS fixed this
loophole by stating that Section 1061 does apply to S corporations.104
Therefore, private investment fund managers, who formed S or C
corporations are likely subject to Section 1061.105

94. Id.
95. Dolson et al., supra note 9.
96. I.R.C. § 1061.
97. Private investment funds invest in securities and commodities, and a range of
other similar financial products. Since carried interest is given to fund managers as a
form of compensation, Section 1061(c)(1)’s definition of specified assets clearly
encompasses fund managers’ carried interests. See id.; Dolson et al., supra note 9;
Sraders, supra note 32.
98. 2017 Tax Reform, supra note 85.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. I.R.C. § 1061.
102. See 2017 Tax Reform, supra note 85.
103. Richard Rubin, Treasury Issues Tax Guidance Limiting Carried-Interest
Provision, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/treasury-issues-taxguidance-limiting-carried-interest-provision-1519921428
[https://perma.cc/KZ8BXRUK].
104. I.R.S. Notice 2018-18, 2018-12 IRB 443.
105. See id.
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B. Private Equity Funds

A Private Equity (PE) fund is an investment vehicle in which a fund
manager pools investors’ capital and invests the fund’s assets.106 PE
funds are extremely significant to the global economy.107 In 2017, PE
funds raised $453 billion,108 and in 2017, PE funds had over $2.8 trillion
of assets under management.109 PE funds are relatively hands-on in
the context of private investment funds, as they typically take a
controlling interest in an operating company, commonly referred to as
a portfolio company, and engage actively in the management of the
business.110 In general, PE funds invest in private companies and focus
on improving operations or cutting unnecessary expenses.111 PE fund
managers strive to increase the value of businesses in order to profit
off of a later sale.112 Like other private investment vehicles, a PE fund
is managed by a fund manager, who is typically compensated according
to the two and twenty compensation structure.113 Thus, PE fund
managers earn most of their income from carried interest and are an
intended target of Section 1061.114
Despite its seemingly significant three-year holding period
requirement, Section 1061 has very little practical effect for funds that
invest long-term, like PE funds.115 The very nature of a PE fund’s
investments involve a long-term focus, and sales made by PE fund
managers may not occur until many years after the initial investment.116
In fact, only 27% of investments by PE funds fell under the three-year

106. J.B. Maverick, Hedge Fund vs. Private Equity Fund: What’s the Difference?,
INVESTOPEDIA
(July
15,
2019),
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/121614/what-difference-between-hedgefund-and-private-equity-fund.asp [https://perma.cc/AA9A-6SHU].
107. See generally Andrew Metrick & Ayako Yasuda, The Economics of Private
Equity Funds, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 2303 (2010).
108. Cardell McKinstry, Private Equity and Venture Capital Firms Still Digesting
Trump
Tax
Reform,
ATLANTA
BUS.
CHRON.
(May
29,
2018),
https://www.bizjournals.com/atlanta/news/2018/05/29/private-equity-and-venturecapital-firms-still.html [https://perma.cc/6JYP-TA6E].
109. URBAN INST. & BROOKINGS INST., TAX POLICY CTR., WHAT IS CARRIED
INTEREST, AND SHOULD IT BE TAXED AS CAPITAL GAIN? (2016),
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-carried-interest-and-should-itbe-taxed-capital-gain [https://perma.cc/5HSY-NZ7C].
110. Maverick, supra note 106.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See Feldman, supra note 14, at 514.
114. See id.; I.R.C. § 1061 (2019).
115. See Rubin, supra note 103.
116. See id.
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holding requirement in 2017.117 Thus, the three-year minimum holding
requirement of Section 1061 is largely irrelevant for PE funds, as they
typically hold investments for more than five years.118
Moreover, relatively straightforward tax planning nullifies the
effects of Section 1061 for PE funds.119 In its definition of “specified
assets,” Section 1061 does not include operating businesses.120 Thus, if
a PE fund invests in various operating business joint ventures and
issues a carried interest, it will likely not fall within the purview of
Specifically, Section 1061(c)(3) requires an
Section 1061.121
examination of the activities of the joint venture to determine if the
issuer of the carried interest is in possession of a specified asset.122
Thus, if a PE fund solely invests in joint ventures only engaged in
operating businesses, any resulting carried interest should not be
subject to Section 1061.123
Furthermore, a PE fund might be able to structure its investments in
such a way as to further minimize the effects of Section 1061.124
Holders of carried interest — especially PE fund managers — might
acquire stock in a particular company, commonly referred to as a
platform company.125 When considering Section 1061’s three-year
holding period requirement, the investor will want to meet this threeyear threshold as quickly as possible.126 One area that might cause
problems is the issuance of new stock.127 Specifically, the issuance of
new stock would trigger a new holding period under Section 1061 and
reset the three-year clock.128 Thus, investors might be able to pay for
additional capital for add-on investments with pro-rata capital
contributions instead of the traditional issuance of additional stock.129
If pro-rata capital contributions are impractical, investors might be

117. Gregg Coughlin, Carried Interest Post-TCJA: Impact on Hedge Funds, Private
Equity, and Real Estate, MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. (Apr. 3, 2019),

http://mbelr.org/carried-interest-post-tcja-impact-on-hedge-funds-private-equity-andreal-estate/ [https://perma.cc/4X8K-M3SA].
118. See URBAN INST. & BROOKINGS INST., supra note 109.
119. Dolson et al., supra note 9.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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able to avoid issuance of new stock by funding additional capital needs
with debt.130
One potential structure would be to designate an LLC or LP as a
holding company over the particular corporate portfolio company.131
In the event that additional funding is necessary for an add-on
investment at the portfolio company, private investment fund
managers could structure such funding at the holding company level.132
This structure would allow fund managers to contribute funds to the
capital of the corporate portfolio company without issuing any new
stock and triggering a new three-year holding period requirement.133
Thus, provided that the stock complies with the three-year holding
period requirement, the capital gain on the sale of the portfolio stock
would flow through to the holding company’s owner and a PE fund
would be able to sell the stock without Section 1061 implications.134
An even simpler planning technique, especially applicable to PE
funds with blocks of portfolio company stock, is the strategic timing of
sales.135 Specifically, if there are blocks of such investments, funds can
choose to time the sale or redemption of the stocks to ensure that
stocks are not sold until they satisfy the three-year holding period
requirement.136 This strategy would be relatively straightforward, as
PE funds typically hold assets for longer than three years.137 Therefore,
such a strategy would not require extensive tax planning.
C. Hedge Funds

A hedge fund is an investment vehicle in which a hedge fund
manager pools investors’ capital and invests in a variety of securities
and equities to generate a positive return.138 Investors include
institutions like pension funds, high-net-worth individuals, or even the
managers themselves.139 In 2018, hedge funds had approximately $3.2
trillion under management, making them a significant force in the

130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. URBAN INST. & BROOKINGS INST., supra note 109.
138. See Sraders, supra note 32.
139. Kimberly Amadeo, Hedge Fund Investors, BALANCE (June 25, 2019),
https://www.thebalance.com/who-invests-in-hedge-funds-and-why-3306239
[https://perma.cc/J39T-FQRG].
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global economy.140 Similar to PE fund managers, hedge fund managers
are typically compensated according to the two and twenty structure.141
Thus, the 20% of fund managers’ compensation that consists of carried
interest is potentially subject to Section 1061.142
Section 1061 fails to address carried interest distributions from
hedge funds.143 Since hedge funds usually hold investments for less
than one year, hedge fund managers typically were not receiving
preferential tax treatment of carried interest under the previous tax
law.144 However, for those few hedge funds that hold investments for
longer periods, Section 1061 is still easy to circumvent.145 One
relatively straightforward tax planning strategy that might minimize
Section 1061’s effects upon hedge funds involves transferring carried
interest to “unrelated parties.”146 Specifically, Section 1061 states that:
(2) Related person. For purposes of this paragraph, a person is
related to the taxpayer if —
(A) the person is a member of the taxpayer’s family within the
meaning of section 318(a)(1), or
(B) the person performed a service within the current calendar
year or the preceding three calendar years in any applicable trade
or business in which or for which the taxpayer performed a
service.147

Section 318(a)(1) defines “related parties” as an individual’s
“spouse (other than a spouse who is legally separated from the
individual under a decree of divorce or separate maintenance) and his
children, grandchildren, and parents.”148 Thus, the related party
definition in Section 1061 does not include attribution from
partnerships, estates, trusts, and corporations.149 Solely including
immediate family members and current or recent fund management
colleagues without attribution rules creates a very significant tax
planning consideration for private investment fund managers.150
140. Matt Egan, Hedge Funds Assets Plunged by $88 Billion in 2018, CNN (Jan. 25,
2019),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/25/investing/hedge-funds-2018markets/index.html [https://perma.cc/8CQB-RRGW].
141. See Sraders, supra note 32.
142. See I.R.C. § 1061 (2019); Coughlin, supra note 117.
143. Dolson et al., supra note 9.
144. See I.R.C. § 1061; Dolson, supra note 10.
145. Dolson et al., supra note 9.
146. See id.
147. See I.R.C. § 1061.
148. Id. § 318.
149. See id. §§ 318, 1061; Dolson et al., supra note 9.
150. Dolson et al., supra note 9.
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These related party classifications allow private investment fund
managers to utilize tax planning strategies to avoid Section 1061’s
three-year holding requirement.151 Specifically, a distribution would
only trigger Section 1061 if it was transferred directly to a related
party.152 Since the attribution rules of Section 318(a)(2) are clearly
omitted from the statute, a fund manager might be able to transfer
carried interest to an entity owned by a related party and the related
party would be able to avoid the three-year holding requirement.153
Importantly, the transferee-entity would need to be regarded as a
taxpayer in a manner that is separate from the particular related
party.154 Although the related party classifications will capture some
transactions, these classifications are clearly narrow and enable private
investment fund managers to avoid the restrictions of Section 1061.155
Under Section 1061, hedge fund managers and all private investment
fund managers may avoid the three-year holding requirement by
distributing appreciated partnership assets as a form of carried
interest.156 The fund manager would then be free to sell the
appreciated assets and avoid Section 1061’s three-year holding
requirement.157 These various tax planning strategies make it clear
that Section 1061 will likely not have a significant effect upon the
taxation of carried interest, especially when considering that private
investment fund managers have access to some of the most capable
attorneys and accountants.158 Section 1061 fails to achieve a
substantive revision of the taxation of carried interest because
elementary tax planning allows fund managers to avoid any restrictions
imposed.159 The preferential tax treatment of carried interest remains
controversial, as both critics and proponents of this preferential tax
treatment present strong arguments in favor of and opposing tax
reform in this area.160

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Marron, supra note 39, at 1–2.
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II. THE GREAT TAX DEBATE

Given the trillions of dollars of assets under management and
extraordinarily high income flowing to fund managers, it is
unsurprising that the taxation of carried interest is highly controversial
within tax law.161 When evaluating an aspect of tax law, it is helpful to
evaluate tax policy, fiscal policy, and general public policy.162 The
primary tax policy considerations include vertical equity, horizontal
equity, economic neutrality, and administrability.163 Vertical equity is
based upon the idea of taxing different taxpayers progressively,
meaning taxing individuals at higher rates relative to income.164
Horizontal equity focuses upon taxing similar earners uniformly.165
Economic neutrality concentrates upon avoiding the influence of
taxpayer preferences due to taxation.166 Lastly, administrability
focuses upon the practicability — the difficulty of implementation and
Furthermore, the four primary fiscal policy
enforcement.167
considerations include economic growth, economic stability, raising
revenue for expenditures, and increased employment.168 As discussed
in the Sections below, both critics and proponents of the current tax
treatment of carried interest make arguments based on these factors,169
and raise strong points and help to illustrate the importance of the
taxation of carried interest to tax law in general.
A. The Critics of the Preferential Tax Treatment of Carried Interest

Critics of the preferential tax treatment of carried interest are quite
vocal regarding their dissatisfaction with the current tax law. For
example, when discussing the need to reform the taxation of carried
interest, President Obama pointed out that “the top 25 hedge fund
managers made more than all the kindergarten teachers in the
country.”170 Furthermore, President Trump referred to hedge fund
managers as “paper pushers” and claimed they were “getting away

161. Fleischer, Two and Twenty, supra note 21.
162. See Feldman, supra note 14, at 522–23.
163. Id. at 523.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See id. at 524.
169. See id.
170. President Barack Obama, Conversation on Poverty at Georgetown University,
YOUTUBE (May 12, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vaGnNQ6Jr_8
[https://perma.cc/NT5A-NZFN].
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with murder,” partly due to the preferential tax treatment of carried
interest.171 Moreover, Professor Victor Fleischer declared that “the
status quo treatment of a profits interest in a partnership is no longer a
tenable position to take as a matter of sound tax policy.”172
Critics primarily rely upon a variety of tax policy rationales in
claiming that carried interest should be taxed as ordinary income.173
They argue that taxing carried interest as ordinary income would
increase vertical equity, as the extremely wealthy investment fund
managers would pay tax at a higher rate; this higher tax rate is more
appropriate for their high income levels under a progressive tax
model.174 Moreover, these wealthy investment fund managers are
financially able to pay this higher rate of taxation because of their
significant compensation packages.175 This idea of taxing higher
income earners at a higher tax rate is the basis of our progressive
income tax system, and vertical equity clearly points to carried interest
tax reform.176
Similarly, critics also claim that taxing carried interest as ordinary
income aligns with horizontal equity.177 Specifically, taxing carried
interest as ordinary income would put fund managers on the same basis
as other similarly situated service-providing taxpayers.178 Critics adopt
what is called the “labor services view,” in which carried interest should
be taxed as ordinary income, as it most closely resembles wages.179
Economists consider most of carried interest to be performance-based
compensation for the general partners rather than a return of
previously invested capital as the tax code currently treats it.180 Carried
interest is paid to private investment fund managers as an
incentivization device similar to the bonus-heavy compensation
structure in investment banking.181 Investment bankers and other
professionals pay ordinary income tax rates on their salaries and
bonuses.182 Furthermore, for most service providers, their income is

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Hsu, supra note 80.
Fleischer, Two and Twenty, supra note 21, at 59.
Marron, supra note 39, at 1–2.
See Feldman, supra note 14, at 523.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Marron, supra note 39, at 1–2.
See The Taxation of Carried Interest, supra note 1, at 1.
See id. at 7.
See id. at 5.
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treated as ordinary income and taxed at the applicable rates.183 Thus,
critics believe carried interest should be treated as ordinary income,
notwithstanding that the underlying investments generate capital
gains.184
Moreover, commentators also argue that taxing carried interest as
ordinary income would be best for economic neutrality.185 Specifically,
critics claim that the preferential tax treatment of carried interest is
persuading individuals to become investment fund managers instead of
pursuing other careers as potential doctors, lawyers, and scientists, for
example.186 Thus, commentators argue that this is problematic on an
economic neutrality basis, as the tax law should not have such a
significant impact upon taxpayer decision-making, and there is no need
to encourage individuals to become investment fund managers.187
Commentators also argue the ease of administrability and
enforcement shows that carried interest should simply be taxed as
ordinary income.188 Specifically, commentators can claim that taxing
carried interest as ordinary income would be relatively easy for the
government.189 If carried interest is simply treated as ordinary income,
the government would no longer need to track investment holding
periods related to carried interest taxation or request as much
investment information for investment fund managers’ individual tax
returns.190 Moreover, there would be no need to determine which
portion of carried interest constitutes labor income and investment
income as required by various proposals.191 Carried interest would
simply be categorized and taxed as ordinary income without any of
these additional steps.192
Critics also rely on a variety of fiscal policy rationales to show the
benefits of treating carried interest as ordinary income.193 Specifically,
commentators who criticize the current law claim that taxing carried
interest as ordinary income would raise significant tax revenues.194 It
is estimated that private investment funds currently have over $2
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id.
Id. at 1.
See Feldman, supra note 14, at 523.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 524.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Fleischer, Carried Interest Tax, supra note 12.
See id.
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trillion under management.195 Thus, the gains made upon such a large
principle have significant tax revenue implications. It is very difficult
to ascertain the tax revenue implications of treating carried interest as
ordinary income, as carried interest is based upon fund performance
relying on numerous economic factors.196 By some estimates, taxing
carried interest as ordinary income would raise as much as $180 billion
over ten years.197 Critics identify public programs that could be funded
or governmental debt that could be paid down with such an increase in
tax revenues.198
Critics also rely on general public policy-based arguments.
Specifically, critics emphasize the public outrage of the preferential tax
treatment of carried interest.199 Famed investor and philanthropist
Warren Buffet, has made public comments emphasizing the
ramifications of the preferential tax treatment of carried interest.200
Buffet found it absurd that private investment fund managers might
pay taxes at a lower effective tax rate “than our receptionists do or our
cleaning ladies.”201 Critics also point to general morality and
distributive justice-based arguments.202 Distributive justice-based
arguments focus on the apportionment of goods in consonance with the
best interests of society.203 Thus, critics point to the distributive justice
concerns that the tax law allows some of the world’s wealthiest
individuals to pay a lower effective tax rate than middle-class
earners.204 Critics claim such a reality is both untenable and unfair.205
B. The Proponents of the Current Carried Interest Tax Law

Proponents of the tax treatment of carried interest as long-term
capital gains rely on their own tax policy, fiscal policy, and general

195. Fleischer, Two and Twenty, supra note 21, at 35.
196. Fleischer, Carried Interest Tax, supra note 12.
197. See id.
198. Id.
199. See Feldman, supra note 14, at 515.
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. Fleischer, Two and Twenty, supra note 21, at 5.
203. See
Distributive
Justice,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/distributive%20justice
[https://perma.cc/H2GQ-EVS3] (last visited Mar. 7, 2019) (“[T]he justice that is
concerned with the apportionment of privileges, duties, and goods in consonance with
the merits of the individual and in the best interest of society.”).
204. Fleischer, Two and Twenty, supra note 21, at 5.
205. See id. at 4–5.

738

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVII

public policy-related arguments.206 In terms of tax policy, proponents
of the current tax law claim that treating carried interest as a long-term
capital gain satisfies horizontal equity.207 Specifically, proponents of
the current tax law advocate for the “entrepreneurship view” that
carried interest serves as a reward for fund managers who help new
ventures prosper, businesses improve, and create greater business
value.208 Proponents emphasize the similarity of managing a private
investment fund to the work of entrepreneurs that start new businesses
and treat a portion of their returns as capital for contributing “sweat
equity.”209 Specifically, since it is so difficult to measure the
performance of sweat equity, the American tax system usually allows
labor income to be converted to capital.210 Thus, proponents claim
carried interest should be treated as long-term capital gains, like the
gains of angel investors and entrepreneurs who risk financial capital
and sweat equity in businesses.211
Proponents, including fund managers themselves, make another
horizontal equity-based argument by claiming that carried interest is
more appropriately taxed as a long-term capital gain because it is
completely dependent upon the vicissitudes of the markets.212 If a fund
manager does not make the right investments and as a result does not
reach the agreed upon profitability threshold, he or she will not receive
carried interest.213 Unlike an attorney’s or banker’s compensation,
carried interest has this commonality with sales of securities and other
transactions treated as capital gains.214 Although bonuses and certain
salary agreements are not always guaranteed, carried interest’s
additional and significant reliance upon market forces renders it more
appropriately taxed as a capital gain.215
Furthermore, proponents of the current carried interest tax law
claim that any perceived horizontal inequity resulting from the taxation
of carried interest stems from the preferential tax treatment of long-

206. See Feldman, supra note 14, at 523–24.
207. See id. at 523.
208. Marron, supra note 39, at 2.
209. Id.
210. URBAN INST. & BROOKINGS INST., supra note 109.
211. See id.
212. Gerry Langeler, Another View: In Defense of Carried Interest, N.Y. TIMES
(May 20, 2010), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/05/20/another-view-in-defense-ofcarried-interest/ [https://perma.cc/JB6G-AM45].
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. See id.
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term capital gains.216 Specifically, proponents claim that carried
interest taxation is simply an application of the tax code to a particular
situation.217 The large tax savings derived from the current system
should not be dealt with by adjusting carried interest tax law. Instead,
the issue should be addressed by revising the tax treatment of longterm capital gains generally.218 Thus, proponents claim that dealing
with preferential capital gains tax rates directly would be more
effective and efficient than disturbing existing carried interest tax
law.219
Proponents of the current tax law also emphasize the ease of
administrability and enforcement of simply leaving carried interest
taxation alone.220 Specifically, these proponents claim that treating
carried interest as a long-term capital gain does not put any extreme
logistical strain on the IRS.221 Proponents emphasize that the current
tax treatment of carried interest avoids any intensive factual analysis
requiring research and fact gathering.222 Therefore, treating carried
interest as a long-term capital gain avoids the need to differentiate
between labor and investment income or to deduce which income was
generated by investment services partnerships or other types of
partnerships.223
Proponents of the preferential tax treatment of carried interest also
rely upon the basic principles of partnership taxation.224 Specifically,
proponents claim that the basic principles underlying Subchapter K
clearly support the preferential tax treatment of carried interest.225 As
codified in Subchapter K, partnership tax law as a whole is designed to
tax partners in a manner similar to which they would be taxed at the
individual level.226 If general partners of private investment funds
directly invested in portfolio companies, or purchased and sold shares
216. See David A. Weisbach, The Taxation of Carried Interests in Private Equity,
94 VA. L. REV. 715, 763 (2008).
217. Tax experts claim that the tax savings associated with carried interest is simply
an application of the broader capital gains tax law. Therefore, the preferential tax
treatment of carried interest should be addressed by reforming capital gains taxation
as a whole, rather than by reforming capital gains taxation as it applies to carried
interest. See id.
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See Feldman, supra note 14, at 524.
221. Id.
222. See id.
223. See id.
224. See id. at 545–47.
225. See id.
226. See id.; I.R.C. § 701 (2019).
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of public companies for a profit, it is clear that any profits received
would be characterized as capital gains.227 For example, if instead of
raising capital by receiving contributions from limited partners, general
partners simply borrowed money from limited partners and then used
these loans as contributions to the fund, it is likely that any profits
generated would be treated as capital gains.228 Proponents claim that
since the general partner would be viewed as the owner of the
borrowed funds, any investments made would be viewed as direct
investments by the general partner and any profits would be
characterized as capital gains.229
Furthermore, proponents emphasize that the flow-through taxation
of partnerships can be a significant advantage and fundamental reason
for choosing to form a partnership.230 Moreover, proponents state that
partnership tax law is designed to permit investors to conduct
businesses, including investment-related businesses, in a flexible
arrangement without any additional entity level tax.231 Proponents
claim these fundamental principles indicate that any investment
income earned by private investment fund managers must keep its
capital characterization regardless of any labor performed to produce
such returns.232
Proponents also rely on an array of fiscal policy rationales to
maintain the current tax treatment of carried interest.233 In terms of
economic growth, proponents emphasize that higher taxes generally
impede economic growth by stifling economic investment and
entrepreneurship.234 Moreover, proponents claim applying a higher
tax rate to carried interest would be far above the revenue maximizing
tax rate.235 These proponents argue that private investment funds help
fuel businesses, help businesses become more efficient, and create
jobs.236 Thus, proponents claim that changing the preferential tax

227. See David A. Weisbach, The Taxation of Carried Interests in Private Equity 2
(John M. Olin Program in Law and Econ., Working Paper No. 365, 2007).
228. See id. at 26–27.
229. See id.
230. The flow-through taxation of partnerships allows partners to be taxed at the
individual level and can offer significant tax advantages, such as recognizing gains at
individual income rates. See I.R.C. § 701; Feldman, supra note 14, at 546–47.
231. See Feldman, supra note 14, at 546–47.
232. See id.
233. See id. at 524.
234. See id.
235. See id.
236. See Swenson, supra note 13, at 5.
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treatment might cause funds to relocate or close, which will hurt
economic growth.237
Proponents also emphasize that the current tax treatment of carried
interest enhances economic stability.238 Specifically, proponents
emphasize that billions of dollars are contributed into private
investment funds each year,239 and moreover, investment funds have
trillions of dollars under management.240 Increasing the tax rate on
carried interest could cause private investment fund managers to invest
less into funds.241 Furthermore, an increase in the taxation of carried
interest might cause private investment fund managers to charge a
higher rate of carried interest to offset higher taxes, causing investors
to invest less to avoid these higher fees and a decrease in contributions
might decrease returns to investors.242 Thus, proponents claim that
reformation of the current carried interest law would create significant
economic instability, as the increase in taxation of carried interest
might cause an overall reduction in contributions to private investment
funds.243
Furthermore, proponents also claim that taxing carried interest as
ordinary income would not significantly raise tax revenues.244
Specifically, they point to studies performed by the Joint Committee
on Taxation, which estimate that such a tax change would only raise
about $14 billion from 2019 through 2028.245 Moreover, with a national
debt of $22 trillion, these proponents emphasize that such small
revenues would have a minimal practical effect on the national
budget.246 Furthermore, proponents go even further by claiming that
increasing the taxation of carried interest would actually decrease tax
revenues.247 Specifically, these proponents claim that tax reform in this

237. Id. at 23.
238. See Feldman, supra note 14, at 524.
239. See id.
240. Fleischer, Two and Twenty, supra note 21, at 35.
241. See Feldman, supra note 14, at 524.
242. See id. at 524–25.
243. See generally id.
244. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TAX CARRIED INTEREST AS ORDINARY INCOME
(2018),
http://www.cbo.gov/budget-options/2018/54795
[https://perma.cc/B5M39DRH].
245. Id.
246. See generally id.; see also Bill Chappell, U.S. National Debt Hits Record $22
Trillion,
NAT’L
PUB.
RADIO
(Feb.
13,
2019),
https://www.npr.org/2019/02/13/694199256/u-s-national-debt-hits-22-trillion-a-newrecord-thats-predicted-to-fall [https://perma.cc/P39E-3NT3].
247. See Feldman, supra note 14, at 524.
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area would disincentivize fund investment activity and lead to less tax
revenues due to decreased fund revenues.248
Proponents of the current tax treatment of carried interest also claim
that tax reform in this area would reduce employment in the American
financial sector.249 Since an increase in taxation would potentially
reduce the amount of capital contributed to private investment funds,
the funds available to maintain employment levels would also be
reduced.250 Thus, proponents claim that carried interest tax reform
would potentially lead to an outsourcing of jobs to foreign nations that
have more favorable tax codes, decreasing employment and tax
revenues in the process.251
Lastly, proponents of the current tax treatment of carried interest
highlight the issue of investor fairness.252 Investors and private
investment fund managers negotiate these fee arrangements, which are
often very extensive and likely involve high agency costs.253 A central
aspect of the fee arrangement involves the current preferential taxation
of carried interest.254 Proponents claim altering this significant area of
tax law will assign risk to investors who have already negotiated these
agreements, fundamentally altering the economic relationships of
investors and managers.255 Specifically, since agreements usually
involve clawback and tax distribution provisions, proponents claim a
change in the taxation of carried interest might cause fund managers to
make riskier investments.256 Therefore, a change in the taxation of
carried interest would essentially cause a shifting of risks to investors
without any consideration.257 Proponents claim altering the current tax

248. See id.
249. See id. at 524–25.
250. See id.
251. See id.
252. See id. at 547–48.
253. See id.
254. See id.
255. See id.
256. See id. Fund agreements typically include clawback provisions. A clawback
provision indicates whether and how much of a carried interest a private investment
fund manager must return to the fund if early distributions of carried interest exceed
the profit to which the manager was ultimately entitled. This is one of the most
significant economic provisions in a fund agreement. Moreover, funds also typically
include tax distribution provisions. Specifically, tax distribution provisions are made to
certain partners in an amount to enable a partner to pay tax on income allocated to
that partner. These distributions are extremely significant and usually are prioritized
over other distributions. Heather M. Field, The Return-Reducing Ripple Effects of the
“Carried Interest” Tax Proposals, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 13, 33 (2012).
257. See Feldman, supra note 14, at 547–48.
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treatment of carried interest would produce unintended and indirect
economic consequences to parties who contracted under the current
tax law.258
III. MODERATE REFORM AND ITS IMPORTANCE TO URBAN AREAS

Although both critics and proponents of the preferential tax
treatment of carried interest make strong arguments, a compromise is
clearly necessary. Carried interest should be neither solely taxed as a
capital gain nor as ordinary income. A moderate revision of Section
1061 would allow legislators to effectively balance the incentivization
benefits of the preferential tax treatment of carried interest, while also
taxing more carried interest at ordinary income rates. An increase in
the holding period requirement from three years to a period in the
range of five to seven years, a more expansive definition of “related
parties,” and bringing other investment types under its purview are
potential avenues to consider.259 Furthermore, the importance of
private investment funds is especially evident in urban areas. Thus,
legislators must be especially cognizant of the economic growth that
funds bring to cities and states, such as New York City and New
York.260
A. Section 1061: A Balancing Act

While both sides of the debate on the carried interest taxation law
present strong arguments, neither side is completely correct. If carried
interest is solely taxed as a capital gain, the government will lose tax
revenues and public outrage would continue to be significant.261 Yet,
if carried interest is taxed as ordinary income, individuals might not
enter the industry or invest in certain urban areas.262 Thus, instead of
solely taxing all carried interest as ordinary income or completely
retaining the preferential tax treatment, the appropriate middle ground
would be to strengthen Section 1061 by increasing its holding period
requirements, expanding its definition of related parties, and bringing
different investment types under its purview.
The three-year holding period requirement of Section 1061 must be
increased to have any significant effect upon private investment fund

258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

See id.
See generally I.R.C. § 1061 (2019).
See Swenson, supra note 13, at 3.
See Fleischer, Two and Twenty, supra note 21, at 5.
Swenson, supra note 13, at 14–15.
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managers, especially PE fund managers.263 Legislators, however, must
also weigh the potential disincentivizing effects that a long holding
period requirement may have upon fund managers.264 A potential
solution would balance the public benefits of a longer holding period
requirement with the drawbacks and incentivization issues associated
with a longer holding period.265 Since PE fund managers generally
hold investments for much longer than three years, the current version
of Section 1061 is virtually ineffective.266 Although it is difficult to
calculate an optimal holding period requirement, a holding period of
five to seven years would be sufficient, as it is sufficient time to capture
certain activities of fund managers, but it is not overly restrictive.267
For example, in 2017, only 27% of PE fund investments were held for
less than three years268 — the median holding period of PE fund
investments was around 5.2 years.269
Therefore, a five- to seven-year holding period would bring certain
PE and hedge fund managers under the purview of Section 1061,
allowing the statute to have a meaningful impact upon the taxation of
carried interest.270 Nonetheless, PE fund managers who hold
investments longer than the five- to seven-year holding period would
still be rewarded with the preferential tax treatment of carried
interest.271 Moreover, for hedge funds, a holding period of five to seven
years would continue to have a small effect upon hedge funds that focus
upon very short-term investments (such as less than one year), as these
fund managers already fall under the purview of Section 1061.272 Yet,
a five- to seven-year holding period requirement would affect hedge
fund managers who hold investments for an intermediate period of
time (five to seven years).273 Furthermore, such a holding period would
still allow hedge fund managers who hold investments for longer than

263. See Coughlin, supra note 117 (discussing the shortcomings of the three-year
holding period requirement).
264. See Swenson, supra note 13, at 14.
265. See id.
266. Coughlin, supra note 117.
267. See generally id. (discussing the advantages of holding periods longer than
three years).
268. Adam Lewis, 3 Ways US Tax Reform Will Impact Private Equity, PITCHBOOK
(Mar. 1, 2018), https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/3-ways-us-tax-reform-will-impactprivate-equity [https://perma.cc/5DX8-ZCZQ].
269. Id.
270. See generally Coughlin, supra note 117.
271. See id.; I.R.C. § 1061 (2019).
272. I.R.C. § 1061; see Coughlin, supra note 117.
273. I.R.C. § 1061; see Coughlin, supra note 117.
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five to seven years to enjoy the preferential tax treatment of carried
interest.274
The definition of “related parties” in Section 1061 should also be
revised to explicitly bring in the Section 318(a)(2) attribution rules to
define a “related party.”275 Section 1061 currently opens the door for
fund managers to avoid Section 1061 by having relatives or colleagues
create certain legal entities.276 Specifically, because the attribution
rules from partnerships, estates, trusts, and corporations are currently
absent from Section 1061, a private investment fund manager can
distribute carried interest directly to a business entity owned by a
related party and, thus, avoid Section 1061’s holding period
requirements.277 If the Section 318(a)(2) attribution rules from
partnerships, estates, trusts, and corporations applied, then fund
managers could not contribute their carried interests to such entities.278
Additionally, due to the sophistication of fund managers, legislators
should consider further expanding the definition of “related parties” to
include “siblings,” “aunts,” and “uncles.”279 Moreover, revising
Section 1061’s “related party” section to include persons who
performed a service within the preceding ten calendar years would
make Section 1061 more effective.280 Section 1061’s “related parties”
section only includes former colleagues of the previous three years,
allowing fund managers to have former colleagues assist them in
avoiding the restrictions.281 Thus, classifying all colleagues within the
previous ten calendar years as “related parties” would avoid this
possibility by requiring a longer period to pass before such transactions
would be considered to be at arm’s length.282 The “related parties”
definition in Section 1061 should not leave any options open for fund
managers to circumvent Section 1061 by employing such tax planning
strategies.283
An additional, necessary revision to strengthen Section 1061
involves bringing direct investments in operating businesses under its
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purview.284 Specifically, an operating business produces goods or
services, whereas a holding company only owns assets.285 Currently,
the specified assets of Section 1061 do not include investments in
operating businesses,286 allowing private investment fund managers to
avoid Section 1061 by solely investing in joint ventures engaged in
operating businesses.287 Since governments want to encourage
investing in operating businesses for job creation purposes, a similar
balancing act would be required. Categorizing investments in
operating businesses as specified assets under Section 1061 would not
be overly effective, as many private investment funds hold investments
in operating businesses for long periods (i.e., more than three years) to
improve operations before an eventual sale.288 Therefore, these
investments would easily satisfy the holding period requirements under
the current version of Section 1061.289 Yet, adding operating business
investments into Section 1061’s specified assets would cover any
opportunities for fund managers to purchase an operating business for
a quick sale.290 Thus, categorizing investments in operating businesses
as specified assets along with the aforementioned holding requirement
of five to seven years would effectively balance tax revenue
considerations with potential incentivization issues.291
Another potential revision that would strengthen Section 1061 while
maintaining certain incentivization benefits is designating a specified
percentage of carried interest as ordinary income and a specified
percentage as capital gains.292 Senator Sander Levin’s 2009 proposal
attempted to strike such a balance.293 In what was planned to become
I.R.C. Section 710, a fixed percentage of any partnership distribution
to private investment fund managers was characterized as ordinary
income notwithstanding the original character of the income or

284. I.R.C. § 1061; Dolson et al., supra note 9.
285. Fraser Sherman, What Is the Difference Between an Operating Company and
CHRON
(Feb.
5,
2019),
a
Holding
Company,
https://smallbusiness.chron.com/difference-between-operating-company-holdingcompany-10752.html [https://perma.cc/G2EA-JM4K].
286. I.R.C. § 1061; Dolson et al., supra note 9.
287. I.R.C. § 1061; Dolson et al., supra note 9.
288. See Dolson, supra note 10, at 1.
289. I.R.C. § 1061 (d)(2)(B).
290. See id.; Dolson et al., supra note 9.
291. I.R.C. § 1061; see Dolson et al., supra note 9.
292. See Feldman, supra note 14, at 528.
293. H.R. 1935, 111th Cong. (2009). Senator Levin’s 2009 proposal would have been
part of the Job Creation and Tax Cuts Act of 2010. See id.
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whether it led to preferential long-term capital gains tax treatment.294
Similarly, it would have allowed a certain percentage of carried interest
to retain its pass-through capital gains character.295 The 2009 Levin
Bill proposed a 75/25 split, where 75% of profits allocated to private
investment fund managers based on profits interest would be taxed at
the higher ordinary income rates and 25% would maintain passthrough capital gains tax treatment.296
Although Section 710 received great criticism, utilizing a revised
fixed-percentage treatment in Section 1061 would be effective.297
Considering the failure of the 2009 Levin Bill, a more politically
acceptable breakdown could be a 50/50 split.298 Under this structure,
50% of profits allocated to private investment fund managers based on
profits interest would be taxed as ordinary income, and a maximum of
50% would retain the preferential long-term capital gains tax
treatment, if applicable.299 Specifically, the potential capital gains
portion should solely be characterized as a long-term capital gain if it
would be considered a long-term capital gain under Section 1061’s
three-year holding period requirement.300 Thus, this revision would
establish a proposed maximum portion of the carried interest that
could potentially be treated as a long-term capital gain if an interest
has been held for at least three years.301 Any remainder under the 50%
ceiling not held for a minimum of three years would be taxed as
ordinary income.302 As a result, the federal government would gain
additional tax revenues, and private investment fund managers would
retain significant tax advantages.303
B. New York City: The Private Investment Funds Capital

Although private investment funds are primarily focused upon
generating returns for investors and managers, their investment
activities also have positive impacts on cities and localities.304 The
presence of private investment funds is most significant in New
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York.305 Estimates indicate that 40% of all hedge fund managers are
based in New York State.306 Moreover, these New York-based hedge
funds manage 60% of all assets under management worldwide.307 To
illustrate the significance of such an amount, hedge fund managers in
Connecticut, often referred to as the hedge fund capital of the world,
manage only 8% of assets under management worldwide.308
Private investment funds directly employ 134,000 New York State
residents.309 Direct employees include fund managers, research
analysts, investor relations personnel, compliance teams, in-house legal
counsel, tax teams, information technology teams, and many other
positions.310 Since the investment fund industry requires outside
services, it has a “ripple through” effect, including the employment of
third parties that the fund hires to perform tasks.311 Specifically,
investment funds require outside consultants, lawyers, accountants,
analysts, etc.312 Thus, when factoring in these indirectly-created jobs,
the investment fund industry employs an additional 236,000 New
Yorkers with an average salary of over $200,000.313 In total, the
investment fund industry accounts for more than 370,000 jobs and $4.5
billion in compensation.314 These salaries are then spent, invested, and
saved, creating even more economic growth in the Empire State.315
Private investment funds also contribute significantly to state and
local tax revenues.316 Specifically, the industry accounts for a
significant amount of New York state and local taxes paid.317 These
state and local taxes include a variety of different taxes.318 High
earners employed by investment funds usually pay high individual
income tax rates.319 Similarly, if corporations are paid, these entities
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also pay income taxes to states and localities.320 Furthermore, private
investment funds also pay sales taxes, property taxes, social insurance
taxes, and any other necessary fees.321 These amounts are very
significant to state and local budgets, as research suggests that the
private investment funds industry contributes almost $4.5 billion per
year to New York state and local tax revenues.322
Moreover, private investment funds also invest directly into many
New York companies, such as Nature’s Bounty Company and
Carestream.323 PE funds invest in many of these New York-based
businesses, help to improve management and efficiency, and make the
businesses more profitable.324 In fact, American Investment Council
research suggests that PE funds invested about $343.11 billion in New
York companies from 2008 to 2018.325 Perhaps more importantly,
these companies employed over 200,000 citizens.326
Furthermore, private investment funds can earn above-market
returns for investors.327 This is especially significant to states and cities
given that pension funds account for 47% of private equity fund
investors.328 In fact, the New York State Common Retirement Fund
and the New York City Public Pension Fund, two of the State’s largest
public pension funds, have invested $26 billion in PE funds.329
Moreover, out of all of the New York State Common Retirement
Fund’s asset classes, private equity investments are the highest
returning asset class over both the short and long term.330 In 2019, the
New York State Common Retirement Fund enjoyed an 18.7% return
on private equity investments.331 The evidence suggests that private
investment funds are helping city residents retire and save.332
In addition to these more obvious benefits of private investment
funds, there are other less readily recognizable benefits.333 For
example, New York State’s tech sector accounts for a significant
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portion of the State’s economy and has supported the development of
newer and larger companies.334 An important reason for the rise of
tech in New York City is access to capital, primarily from New York’s
various private investment funds.335 Carried interest tax reform might
cause private investment funds to leave the United States, which might
lead these tech companies to also relocate to nations with more access
to capital.336 Moreover, carried interest tax reform might also lead to
new funds choosing to locate elsewhere.337 Thus, the now bountiful tax
base from carried interest and businesses could decrease dramatically,
leaving New York State and New York City deprived of billions of
dollars of tax revenues.338
Furthermore, private investment fund managers have grown to
become not only some of New York City’s highest income earners, but
also the City’s biggest philanthropists.339 The competitive nature for
which the industry is known has led investment fund managers to invite
colleagues and competitors into philanthropic efforts and has created
a competitive cycle.340 Not only do fund managers try to outperform
one another in the workplace, but they also strive to out-give one
another, which has led charities to raise record amounts.341 As uberwealthy private investment fund managers look for charitable causes,
many are attracted to local causes in New York City.342 Moreover,
these private investment fund managers are looking to be involved and
take a hands-on approach to helping charities grow.343 Thus, this leads
them to turn to more community-based charities.344
Private investment fund managers founded and maintained some of
the most well-known and influential New York City charities.345 The
Robin Hood Foundation, which is famous for fighting poverty in New
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York City, was founded by Larry Robbins, founder of Glenview
Capital Management.346 The Robin Hood Foundation’s charity galas
have included 4000 guests and raised up to $32 million.347 Robin Hood
supports New York City’s Brooklyn Kindergarten Society, which helps
New York parents get involved at a daycare center, and Abraham
House Providing, which provides educational services to the children
of incarcerated individuals in the Bronx.348
As the private investment fund industry grows, its other charitable
endeavors continue to focus on helping New York City residents.349 In
2005, Dan Stern, who runs Reservoir Capital, organized a charity event
at Lincoln Center for the Hedge Fund Council featuring Jon Stewart,
then-host of The Daily Show. The event attracted many well-known
private investment fund managers, and in total, it raised $1.4 million
for Lincoln Center.350 Private investment fund managers have also
created philanthropic organizations through industry groups, such as
Hedge Fund Cares, which has donated more than $15 million to
organizations fighting child abuse.351
Despite these various benefits of investment funds, many of the
nation’s most significant states and cities are in debt and in dire need
of tax revenues.352 Specifically, New York State is currently $56.3
billion in debt, according to the full accrual accounting method under
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).353 Moreover, in
2018, New York City’s debt burden grew to $119 billion.354 New York’s
debt has a compounding factor because it has led to higher debt service
costs.355 In fact, for city-supported debt, debt service costs alone were
nearly 11% of city tax revenues in 2018.356 Thus, initiating a higher tax
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upon carried interest might seem tempting to not only federal, but also
New York State and New York City governments.
Given the variety of benefits which private investment funds bring
to New York State and New York City and corresponding debt levels,
the taxation of carried interest will continue to be a significant concern
for not only national, but also state and local governments.357 When
legislators reform the current tax treatment of carried interest, they will
need to balance the benefits that private investment funds provide to
New York State and New York City, as well as the need to pay down
rising debt levels.358 Thus, the taxation of carried interest is especially
relevant to New York State and New York City, and this debate will
continue for years to come.
CONCLUSION

Private investment fund managers are some of the wealthiest people
in the world.359 Fund managers are usually compensated according to
a two and twenty compensation arrangement.360 The 2% of the
compensation is deemed a management fee and is taxed as ordinary
income at a rate of approximately 40%.361 The 20% component is
composed of a profits interest and is colloquially referred to as carried
interest.362 Carried interest can rise to extremely high amounts.363 If
fund managers hold the underlying asset for less than three years, the
resulting carried interest is taxed as a short-term capital gain at a
maximum rate of approximately 40%.364 Controversially, if fund
managers hold the underlying asset for more than three years, it is
currently taxed as a long-term capital gain at a maximum rate of around
20%.365
In response to years of public outrage, the IRS implemented Section
1061, which requires private investment fund managers to hold carried
interests for three years to qualify for long-term capital gains tax
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treatment.366 If this three-year holding period is not met, the carried
interest is taxed at the higher short-term capital gains rate.367 Although
Section 1061 includes this increased holding period requirement, the
revision is not without its flaws.368 Some relatively straightforward tax
planning strategies and the general nature of certain private investment
funds to hold assets for far longer than three years make the statute
relatively insignificant.369
Instead, legislators should revise Section 1061 to make it more
effective.370 Increasing the holding period requirement from three
years to a period in the range of five to seven years would make Section
1061 more effective.371 An increased holding period might capture
investments of private investment funds known for holding
investments for long terms, such as PE funds.372 Moreover, legislators
should expand Section 1061’s definition of “related parties,”
particularly by adding the attribution rules of Section 318(a)(2), which
disallows easy tax avoidance strategies.373 Legislators should also
consider categorizing investments in operating businesses as specified
assets under Section 1061, as such a revision would bring more PE fund
Furthermore, legislators should
managers into its purview.374
categorize a certain percentage of a carried interest as ordinary income
and a certain maximum percentage as long-term capital gains
income.375 Specifically, legislators should allow a predetermined
percentage of carried interest to be taxed as long-term capital gains
provided that the manager satisfies Section 1061’s three-year holding
period requirement for an amount up to a maximum of 50% of the
carried interest.376 This potential 50/50 split would classify a
meaningful amount of carried interest as ordinary income, but such a
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moderate reform would still preserve some preferential tax treatment
to continue to incentivize fund managers.377
Despite the potential benefits of taxing carried interest at higher
rates, legislators must still consider the many benefits that private
investment funds bring to urban areas. New York City is home to some
of the world’s largest private investment funds.378 The private
investment funds industry creates substantial economic growth in New
York State.379 These private investment funds create jobs, pay taxes,
and make large charitable donations to many of the City’s significant
charities.380 Nonetheless, national, state, and city debt levels have
risen, and there is a need for more tax revenues, which can potentially
be generated by carried interest tax reform.381
The debate on the taxation of carried interest will continue in the
coming years. Both critics and proponents of the current tax treatment
of carried interest raise strong arguments.382 As in many areas of tax
law, there may not be a clear answer in the carried interest taxation
debate.383 The public needs lawmakers to address the various issues
and consider all options.384 To successfully reform the taxation of
carried interest, legislators should revise Section 1061 in a way that
balances the needs of society.385 Section 1061 should do a more
effective job of taxing carried interest at ordinary income tax rates,
while also incentivizing private investment fund formation and its
many societal benefits.386
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